Regional Dynamics of Congress and BJP Support: What Do Past Elections Tell Us?

Suraj Jacob examines the geography of BJP and Congress support through the history of Lok Sabha elections.

Suraj Jacob

This is a translation of a Malayalam essay previously published on Ala.

Four decades ago, West Bengal experienced a peculiar election scenario. Although the Congress party was in power at the centre, it consistently suffered electoral losses in the state. ¹. Today, Kerala is seeing a similar situation with respect to the BJP. Although the party has established itself at the national level, it has not been able to win even a single Lok Sabha seat from Kerala. Apart from states with only have one or two seats in the Lok Sabha ², Kerala, with 20 seats, is the only state to not elect a single BJP MP so far. Neighbouring Tamil Nadu has also seldom elected BJP MPs ³.

What might be the consequences of a ‘national’ party receiving a very low share of votes in some regions? Can such a party, despite its national status, be considered as truly representing the country? Will that party’s legitimacy be weakened? Does it raise questions about the unity of the nation? Perhaps such questions are points of concern for the BJP leadership–this might be why the party greatly amped up its efforts to establish a political presence in these regions in the last (2019) elections, going beyond considerations of government formation alone. With the next Lok Sabha elections coming up soon, these questions gain significance yet again. This article examines the geographical spread of BJP support across India over the past decades, also focusing on the context of Kerala. At the same time, this article also looks at the other side of the coin—the geographical shrinkage of support for the Congress party, once a nationally established power ⁴.

The BJP’s March Towards Dominance

The BJP participated in the 1984-85 election that took place soon after its formation, and its electoral base gradually grew in the following decade (1989-98), as Figure 1 shows ⁵. In its second election (1989), the party focused its efforts in the Hindi heartlands and in Gujarat, and largely abstained from competing in the southern, eastern, and northeastern regions. In the next election (1991), bolstered by the nation-wide protests to build a Ram temple in place of the Babri Masjid, the BJP contested in most regions across the country. Even then, 80 percent of its victories occurred in constituencies in Uttar Pradesh (UP)—the epicentre of the Ayodhya movement)—Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, and Gujarat. In 1996, these states accounted for 66 percent of the BJP’s victories, and in 1998, 60 percent. In the 1990s, the party’s base spread to more states: Maharashtra (west), Karnataka (south), and Bihar (east). Fifteen years from its establishment and five elections later, India’s southern, eastern, and northeastern regions remained outside the BJP’s stronghold.

The BJP attempted to transcend this limitation by entering into coalitions with regional parties—such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) or All India Anna DMK (AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in Andhra Pradesh, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Odisha, the Janata Dal (United) [JD(U)] in Bihar, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in Punjab, and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra. In Figures 1 and 2, constituencies where the BJP did not contest are shown in black. Figure 3 shows that the party contested in the most number of seats in 1991 and 1996—even more than the last two ‘Modi wave’ elections. In 1998 and 1999, despite the BJP contesting in only 60-70 percent of the seats owing to an increase in seat-sharing among coalition members, the party performed exceedingly well. In 1999, on the strength of its pre- and post-election alliances, the party lead a government for a full five years for the first time.

Although the BJP’s total seat count did not change between the 1998 and 1999 elections, its geographical spread increased somewhat: as the erstwhile strongholds of UP, MP, Rajasthan, and Gujarat shrank from accounting for 60 percent to 50 percent of the BJP’s victories, Maharashtra, Bihar, and Karnataka grew to account for almost a fourth of the party’s seat share.

In the elections after 1999, the BJP continued to capture more seats in the north and the west, as Figure 3 shows ⁶. Even so, the party did not establish a base in the south and the east. Despite its dominant position in the 2019 election, these regions remained beyond its firm grip (Figure 4).

Six Groups of States

In order to understand the regional dynamics of the BJP’s support base, it is helpful to divide India’s states into six categories. The first consists of historical strongholds of the BJP: UP, MP, Rajasthan, and Gujarat ⁷. Together, these states comprise a third of all Lok Sabha seats, and have historically supplied the most number of BJP MPs (Figure 5, left graph). In addition, this group also has the highest seat share (Figure 5, right graph)—that is, the party won a higher percentage of this region’s seats compared to seats of every other region.

Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Bihar comprise a second group of states. Together, they make up a fourth of all Lok Sabha seats. Unlike the other groups, this group has seen a steady increase in the numbers of BJP MPs (Figure 5) in the last three decades ⁸. Unlike the other groups, the 3 states in this group are not geographically contiguous and have different histories—they are similar only in the trajectory of BJP growth. In contrast to the aforementioned core group, the BJP faced very different terrains in each of these states. In Maharashtra, the BJP was neck-to-neck with regional parties such as the Shiv Sena and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) that had a unified ideology and/or engaged in clientelism (the exchange of material benefits for votes). Bihar and Karnataka remained the BJP’s sole significant inroads into the eastern and southern regions of India, hence their significance. As early as 1991, the BJP won more than half of the seats in the core group – two decades later, the party won more than half of the seats from this second group as well (Figure 5, right graph).

In the two decades between 1999 and 2019, there were 5 general elections in India. This was the period when the BJP became the main rival of the traditionally dominant Congress and later dominated the Congress. In this period, the BJP won an average of 204 seats, with more than half (110) coming from the core group of states, and a fourth coming from the emergent second group outlined above. The seven states in these two groups together provided the BJP 80 percent of its Lok Sabha MPs. In sum, the BJP performed very well in these states which together make up for a major share of all Lok Sabha seats.

Before we move to the southern and eastern regional groups, let us look at the northeast bloc comprising 8 states. Before the ‘Modi wave,’ the BJP did not win even a fifth of the 25 Lok Sabha constituencies from the region. But the party gained a third of the seats from this region in the Modi-led election of 2014, and by 2019 it gained over half the seats, a leap led by Assam ⁹. Therefore, although the region has a relatively small number of Lok Sabha seats, this might well be an emergent core group for the BJP.

At the other end of the spectrum are the southern (Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana) and eastern (West Bengal, Odisha) blocs, where the BJP has won comparatively fewer seats. Note that Karnataka and Bihar are excluded from these groups ¹⁰. The southern bloc represents a fifth of all Lok Sabha seats (101), but in the 1999-2019 period, on average, the BJP won merely four seats from the region! This trend held even during the Modi wave in the 2014 and 2019 elections. In comparison, of the 174 Lok Sabha seats in the core group region, the BJP won 164 seats in 2014, and 154 in 2019 (Figure 5). The eastern bloc represents an eighth (63) of all Lok Sabha seats. Whereas the BJP won 26 seats in the 2019 elections in the region, in all previous elections it had won an average of only 4 seats.

Together, the southern and eastern blocs comprise a third of all Lok Sabha seats in the country—similar to that of the core group described earlier. And yet, for the past three decades, only an average of 7 percent of BJP MPs come from these regions. In short, it is difficult for the BJP to establish durable electoral support in the south and the east (with the notable exception of Karnataka and Bihar).

The BJP’s Performance in Kerala

In general, the southern states have not been strongholds for national parties. James Chiriyankandath’s study notes that these states present greater difficulties for the BJP. As mentioned earlier, among those states represented by more than 2 seats in the Lok Sabha, Kerala is the lone state that has not elected even a single BJP MP so far. Nevertheless, as Figure 6 shows, the party’s vote share in Kerala has grown over time. In 1985, as it did in many parts of India, the BJP contested only a few seats in Kerala—5 of the total 20. In 1989, although the BJP contested in 20 constituencies, its vote share was less than 10 percent in every one of them. In 1991, the BJP gained more than 10 percent vote share in one seat—Thiruvananthapuram in the south—closely followed by Kasargod in the northern tip. In 1996, the BJP gained more than 10 percent vote share in both these constituencies, and its vote share has not fallen below 10 percent since in these two seats. In the 1998 elections, the BJP crossed 10 percent vote share in two more constituencies—Kozhikode in the north, and Mavelikkara in the south—and approached close to a 10-percent share in Manjeri and Ponnani. In 1999, although the NDA coalition changed tact and the BJP contested in only 6 seats in Kerala, the party won over 5 percent vote share in 5 of those seats—and of them, it came close to 10 percent in 3. 1999 was also the year in which the BJP gained a 20 percent vote share in Thiruvananthapuram with O. Rajagopal as candidate.

The 1999-2009 decade saw a break in the BJP’s electoral progress in Kerala. In 2004, the party sustained its vote share but did not increase it (although O. Rajagopal’s vote share in Thiruvananthapuram came close to 30 percent). In 2009, the party’s vote share shrank, reflecting trends elsewhere in India (in Thiruvananthapuram, Shashi Tharoor’s Congress candidacy further shrank BJP’s vote share). Most recently, with the ‘Modi wave,’ the party’s vote share has increased yet again. In 2014, O. Rajagopal attained second place by crossing 30 percent of votes, just 2 percentage points behind Shashi Tharoor. 2019 saw the BJP gain much more ground: while retaining its vote share in Thiruvananthapuram, it also neared a 30-percent vote share in both Thrissur and Patthanamthitta. Despite ceding 5 seats to other parties in the NDA coalition, the party managed to cross 20 percent of votes in Attingal and Palakkad.

Researchers have pointed out some reasons for the BJP’s increasing vote share in Kerala. Cultural/religious issues like the Sabarimala women’s temple entry issue helped the BJP, although perhaps not as much as it had hoped. Another study points to the ‘Hindu atmosphere’ created by BJP-allied religious organizations and how this is likely to produce electoral gains in due time. Yet another study highlights the role of caste in growing BJP support—according to the study, communist party policies have failed to benefit Dalit communities sufficiently and these parties continue to discriminate internally against Dalits.

A Comparative Look at Congress Support

We have seen that the BJPs dominance in recent times is not undergirded by nation-wide support. Was the situation different in the Congress era? To see this, Figure 7 compares the BJP’s victory in 2019 with that of the Congress in 1985 (the best performances of both parties) ¹¹. The 2019 map shows a lack of BJP support in the southern and eastern regions; in contrast, the Congress’ 1985 win does not show such stark regional disparities. Another point of difference between the two apex performances is that, owing to seat-sharing arrangements within the NDA coalition, the BJP contested in fewer seats in 2019 than the Congress did in 1985.

The period of ascendance for the BJP was a time of prolonged decline for the Congress. Figure 8 examines the Congress’ performance across the 12 elections in a forty-year period (1977-2019). The party’s performance shows considerable oscillation—its loss in 1977 shows a contraction of its country-wide support base to peninsular and northeastern India, the following dramatic wins in 1980 and 1985 once again show country-wide geographical support, with the subsequent loss in 1989 showing a contraction once again. These dramatic changes reflect what Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have termed ‘plebiscitary politics’, where a charismatic leader turns elections into plebiscites where voters are reduced to voting for or against such a leader. In the 1990s, there was incremental erosion of the Congress’ geographical base—it lost its early core group in the south as well as support bases all over India (Figure 9). From the late 1990s, the Congress turned to seat-sharing arrangements (black areas on the map). The results of the 1996, 1998, and 1999 elections show that there was no single region where the party enjoyed significant, consistent support. The constituency maps in Figure 9 are markedly different from the 1977 maps of wins (red) and yellow (losses) (Figure 8). This declining trend continued in the 2000s (Figure 10), with the exception of 2009.

In this piece, I have used geographical data to show how the BJP and Congress’ support bases have shifted over the years, attempting to describe and map changes over time. Explaining these changes, however, presents a far more complex challenge. Such an exercise in describing and mapping changes offers a step towards constructing explanations. Hopefully this narrative will help address the larger issues – political representation and legitimacy – mentioned in the introduction.

References

Agarwal, Samantha. 2023. ‘Bivalent Hegemony: How Hindu Nationalists Appeal to Caste-Oppressed People in Communist-Ruled Kerala’. Politics & Society. 

Bala, Kiran, and Sachinder Singh. 2014. ‘Trends and Patterns of Seats Won by the BJP in Indian Parliamentary Elections (1984-2004): A Geographical Analysis’. Transactions 36, no.1, 61-69.

Bijukumar, V. 2023. ‘Transforming Ethno-Regional Parties in Northeast India’. Rethinking Parties in Democratizing Asia, edited by Julio C. Teehankee and Christian Echle. Routledge.

Chiriyankandath, James. 2018. ‘’Yes, but not in the South’: The BJP, Congress, and Reigonal Parties in South India’. Rise of Saffron Power: Reflections on Indian Politics, edited by Mujibur Rehman. Routledge India.

Guilmoto, Christophe Z. 2019. ‘Spatial Analysis of India’s 2019 Elections Reveals the Unique Geography of the Hindu Right’s Victory’. The Conversation, June 19, 2019.

Jacob, Suraj. 2019. ‘Party Types and Electoral Performance across States, 1980–2016’. How India Votes: A State-by-State Look, 95-121. Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan.

Kuchi, Lakshmana Venkat. 2019. ‘The South Wall of India’. The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, June 7, 2019.

Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. 1987. In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State. University of Chicago Press.

Stokes, Susan C. 2011. ‘Political Clientelism’. The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, edited by Robert Goodlin. Oxford University Press.

Paleri, Dayal, and R. Santhosh. ‘‘Elections Can Wait!’ The Politics of Constructing a ‘Hindu Atmosphere’ in Kerala, South India.’ Modern Asian Studies 57, no. 6 (2023): 2067–99.

Varughese, Anil M. 2022. ‘Faith Revival and Issue Framing in Kerala’s 2019 Campaign’. South Asian History and Culture 13, no. 3, 321-339.

 

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About the Author: Suraj Jacob teaches development and policy at Azim Premji University, Bangalore. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Ala editorial team and Joseph John in refining the article.